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ii.

ARGUMENT IN REPLY
I. INTRODUCTION
Idaho Code Section 18-8304 requires a person who is convicted in another jurisdiction to
register as a sex offender in Idaho if the conviction is for a crime that is substantially equivalent to
offenses set forth in the statute and if the person enters this state to establish residency. On December
17, 2002, Appellant, Mr. Knox, was convicted in Oregon of one count of Rape in the Third Degree,
O.R.S. § 163.355 and one count of Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree, O.R.S. § 163.425. Upon his
relocation to Nez Perce County, State of Idaho, Appellant did dutifully register with the State of
Idaho. Mr. Knox has fulfilled, and continues to fulfill, the requirement to register as a sex offender
in the State of Idaho.
On June 2, 2015, Mr. Knox filed a Petition for Release from Registration Requirements and
Expungement of Record. Two months later, on August 5, 2015, the Idaho State Police Bureau of
Criminal Identification (hereinafter "Agency") issued an Agency's Finding of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Final Order Regarding Sex Offender Registration. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Final Order, the Agency concluded that the crimes committed by Mr. Knox in Oregon
were substantially equivalent to those found in I. C. § 18-1508, Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child
under Sixteen. The final section of the Agency determination explained the right to appeal the final
order of the agency. This section explained that any party aggrieved by the final order must file an

appeal within twenty-eight days of the service date of the final order. The Certificate of Service
indicates the Agency's decision was mailed to the Mr. Knox's home on August 5, 2015.
On September 4, 2015, two days after the twenty-eight day deadline from the date of mailing
had passed, Mr. Knox filed a Petition for Judicial Review, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 675270(3 ), of the Agency's August 5, 2015 Final Order where an equivalency determination was made
by it and under the legislative grant of authority provided to the Agency under Idaho Code § 188304 and Idaho Rule of Administrative Procedure I I. I 0.03.12, et seq. Mr. Knox filed the Petition
for Judicial Review on the basis that the Agency's final order \Vas enacted through unlawful
procedure and was unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. In response, the Agency filed a Motion
to Dismiss the Petition for Judicial Review on September 17, 2015.
A hearing on the Agency's Motion to Dismiss was held on June 21, 2016. After oral
arguments and supplemental briefing submitted by both Mr. Knox and the Agency, this Court
rendered its decision on July 22, 2016 and denied the Agency's Motion to Dismiss based upon the
Agency's failure to properly effect service of the Final Order to Mr. Knox's counsel as required
under Idaho Rule of Administrative Procedure 04.11.01.055.04.

MR. KNOX'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE SEX OFFENDER
\VAS TIMELY FILED SO AS TO PRESERVE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF
THIS COURT BECAUSE THE IDAHO SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY FAILED TO SERVE
ITS FINAL ORDER ON MR. KNOX'S COUNSEL.

II.

The Agency's Final Order was not properly served on Mr. Knox's counsel. In fact, it wasn't
served to Mr. Knox's counsel at all. As such, counsel could not file a response to the Agency's final
2

order before the expiration of the motion to reconsider timing. On August 5, 20 I 5, the Idaho Central
Sex Offender Registry issued a Final Order that made an equivalency determination under IDAP A
11.10.03.12. It was mailed to Mr. Knox's residence. Under Idaho Code 67-5273(2),
'·A petition for judicial review of a final order or a preliminary order that has
become final when it \Vas not reviewed by the agency head or preliminary,
procedural or intermediate agency action under section 67-5271(2), Idaho
Code, must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the service date of the
final order, the date when the preliminary order became final, or the service
date of a preliminary, procedural or intermediate agency order, or, if
reconsideration is sought, within twenty-eight (28) days after the service date
of the decision thereon.

Id.
Furthermore, (OAPA 04.11.01.055 sets for the rules the agency must follow for service. The rule
allows the agency to serve documents by regular mail to the party's last known mailing address.
However, the rule also requires service must be made on the representatives of each party.
..The officer designated by the agency to serve documents in a proceeding
11111st serve all orders a11d notices i11 a proceedi11g 011 the represe11tatives of
each party desig11ated pursuant to these rules for that proceeding and upon
other persons designated by these rules or by the agency."
IDAPA 04. I 1.01.055.04 (emphasis added).

In reply to Respondent's brief, it is Mr. Knox's argument that service was not properly
completed because the Agency failed to serve Mr. Knox's counsel as required under IDAPA
04.11.01.055.04. The Agency knew Mr. Knox had representation. During the June 21, 2016 oral
arguments on the Agency's Motion to Dismiss, Respondent's counsel stated that the event that
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triggered a review by the equivalency board was the service of Mr. Knox's original Petition for
Relief from the registration requirement (filed on June 2, 2015 in Nez Perce County Case Number
CV 15-000 IO l 0) to the Central Registry. That Petition was served by Mr. Knox's counsel and
identified Clark and Feeney, LLP as counsel for Mr. Knox. There is nothing in the record which
indicates the Final Order was served on Mr. Knox's counsel. It is clear it was only mailed directly
to Mr. Knox. As such, where service was not made on Mr. Knox's representative, the twenty-eight
day time period did not run, and thus, both the district court and the appellate court has jurisdiction
to hear this matter.
Ill.

RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES

Mr. Knox did not pursue this appeal without a reasonable basis in fact or law to do so. With
regard to the issues presented by Respondent in its opening brief, Mr. Knox did not present those as
his issues on appeal and in fact received a favorable ruling from the district court with regard to
subject matter jurisdiction. With regard to Mr. Knox's issues on appeal, Respondent unreasonably
argues that there is no reasonable basis in fact or law for Mr. Knox to appeal the district court's
ruling. However, as outlined in Mr. Knox's opening brief, there exists a number of factual and legal
considerations that the support the non-frivolous nature of this appeal. As such, Mr. Knox requests
that this court deny Respondent's request for attorneys fees on appeal.
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IV. THE CASE LAW CITED BY RESPONDENT INVOLVES INST ATE CONVICTIONS
AND ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR WHICH INVOLVES AN OUT OF
STATE CONVICTION.

With respect to the equivalency detennination made by the Agency under the legislative
grant of authority provided to it under Idaho Code§ 18-8304( 1)(b) and Idaho Rule of Administrative
Procedure 11.10.03.12 et seq., it is Mr. Knox's primary argument that the Agency's final order was
enacted through unlawful procedure and was unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. Specifically, that
an eq ui val ency determination was made with respect to the petitioner's Oregon o ftenses immcd iate Iy
upon the notification of petitioner·s relocation to Nez Perce County, State ofldaho, in 2003, and that
the SOR cannot now come back with a redetennination following notification of an offender's
petition for relief of the registration requirement.
In response to the case Jaw cited by the SOR, Mr. Knox would simply point out that in each
instance, the cases involve registrants whose offenses and convictions within the State of Idaho
where Idaho had, and at all times retained jurisdiction. Here, this is a matter of an equivalency
detennination being made by the State ofldaho with regard to a conviction in a differentj urisdiction,
yet upon relocation to the State of Idaho, triggered notification and registration under Idaho Code
18-8304( I)(b ).
The relocation case cited by the SOR is State v. Yeoman, 149 Idaho 505, 236 P.3d 1265
(20 l 0), is factually and procedurally distinguishable from this case. First, the defendant in Yeoman
was convicted of a sexual offense outside of Idaho in 1984 and moved to Idaho in 2007. However,
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upon his move to Idaho in 2007, he failed to register as a sex offender under Idaho Code 188304(1 )(b), and was charged with a crime for this failure. Mr. Yeoman's argument is not that the
equi valency determination should have been made using the 2007, or 1984 definitions of aggravated
offense, as is petitioner's argument here, but rather Mr. Yeoman argues that he shouldn't have to
register under Idaho Code 18-8304(1)(b) at all because his crime occurred prior to June 1, 1993.
This is not Mr. Knox's argument, and under Mr. Knox's argument, Mr. Yeoman's equivalency
determination would have been made using the 2007 definitions because that was controlling at the
time he moved and availed himself to the jurisdiction of Idaho.

Like here, where the 2003

equivalency determination was made using the laws applicable and controlling at the time Mr. Knox
moved to Nez Perce County and availed himself to the laws of the State ofldaho.
In Groves ,, State, 156 Idaho 552 (Idaho App. 2014 ), the petitioner was adjudicated and
convicted under the laws of the State ofldaho, and under the due process of his trial, he was afforded
the opportunity to make arguments against the aggravated offense determination. In this case, as Mr.
Knox was adjudicated outside the jurisdiction of Idaho, and he should be afforded the due process
protections of an agency action under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act.
An equivalency determination was made in 2003 when Mr. Knox first moved to Idaho. That
determination was reflected on Mr. Knox's registration information. It was only after Mr. Knox filed
a petition for relief from the duty to register that the Board held a hearing and made a new
determination, without any notification or opportunity for Mr. Knox to be heard.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Petitioner-Appellant Travis Knox, respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the findings of the Hearing Officer and remand the matter back to the State with
instructions to vacate the new equivalency determination of Mr. Knox' Oregon Convictions an
reinstate the original equivalency determination made in 2003.
DATED this 12'h day of July, 2017.

CLARK and FEENEY, LLP
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 121h day of July, 2017, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Cheryl Rambo
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho State Police
700 S. Stratford Drive
Meridian, ID 83642
chervl.rambo(@.isp.idaho.gov
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